Feasibility in disequilibrium models / BEBR No. 807 by Arvan, Lanny

UNIVERSITY OF
ILLINOIS LIBRARY
AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
BOOKSTACKS

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2011 with funding from
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
http://www.archive.org/details/feasibilityindis807arva
Uf
FACULTY WORKING
FAPER NO. 807
Feasibility in Disequilibrium Models
Lanny Aryan
College of Commerce and Business Administration
Bureau of Economic and Business Research
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign

53
FACULTY WORKING PAPER NO. 807
College of Commerce and Business Administration
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
October 1931
Feasibility in Disequilibrium Models
Lanny Arvan, Assistant Professor
Department of Economics

Abstract
In this paper a model is presented where trading can occur out of
equilibrium. In disequilibrium, an agent may make an offer to trade
which no other agent responds to. The distinction between offers and
actual trades is not present in equilibrium models. When some planned
trades do not occur, while other trades are successfully completed, an
agent may end up with an infeasible allocation. Two possible ways to
deal with the feasibility issue are to restrict trade offers or to
create an institutional rule which alters actual trades when feasible
allocations would result. The existence and nature of equilibrium is
investigated under both methods.

Feasibility in Disequilibrium Models
Lanny Arvan
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
I. Introduction
In an economy in disequilibrium there may be trade offers extant
at which no trading actually occurs. A difficulty in formulating models
which allow for disequilibrium trading is the determination of the ap-
propriate constraints on trades proposed by the individual. In disequi-
librium, certain proposed trades will occur, while others will r.ot. If
an agent can't sell at the terms he has proposed, the agent may have in-
sufficient funds to finance demands he has expressed. Individual feasi-
bility becomes an issue in disequilibrium. A Keynesian view, as artic-
ulated by Clower [ ], requires expressed demands to be restricted so
that actual trades are always individually feasible. When such a con-
straint is embedded in an equilibrium model, the resulting equilibrium
may no longer be Walrasian, but an equilibrium will always exist. In
disequilibrium models, this is not so. We will return to this point
later.
The price taking assumption in Keynesian equilibrium models has
been severely criticized. It is argued that quantity constraints pro-
vide evidence of gains to be made from adjusting price. Let's examine
this price adjustment from the point of view of the individual. A ra-
tioned agent will accept less favorable terms of trade in order to in-
crease his trade volume. When such an agent adjusts price, he must feel
that a sufficiently large, additional volume of trade is forthcoming to
warrant the price change. On the other hand, a rationed agent may
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adjust price, in what seeas to be a perverse direction, if he antici-
pates a sufficiently inelastic quantity response. The pricing consid-
erations of an agent in a disequilibrium economy are similar to those
of a monopolist (monopsonist)
.
The distinction between monopoly pricing and pricing in disequilib-
rium is that the monopolist is the sole seller of the particular product,
When there is more than one seller of a homogenous product, the pricing
considerations of sellers are better reflected by the Bertrand-Edgeworth
model. In this model, undercutting the competition yields a discontin-
uous quantity response. In a static framework, an equilibrium with ra-
tioning can only be sustained if there are some costs, e.g., search or
advertising costs, which smooth out this discontinuity. In a dynamic
framework, there are a myriad of reasons why such an equilibrium may be
sustained. Note that in a dynamic framework, current pricing decisions
may influence future trading opportunities, since agents may base their
pricing decisions on the past as well as the present. We restrict our
attention to static models and assume that market information is perfect
and transactions are costless. The price taking assumption is not ap-
propriate in this case, if there is rationing.
It is net obvious, however, that the price taking assumption is
justifiable when markets clear. We will examine the perception of mar-
ket power from the point of view of a buyer in a market which is cur-
rently clearing. When the buyer does not perceive an infinitely elastic
supply curve at the market clearing price, the buyer will find it opti-
mal to lover price. As long as the buyer is an atom, though perhaps
very small, the buyer should realize that he can cause excess supply by
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holding up on his demand at the market clearing price. Those sellers
who are rationed will be willing to sell somewhat at prices lower than,
but near to the market clearing price. The aggregate supply at these
lower prices will depend on how sellers are rationed at the market
clearing price.
V.'hen sellers are rationed in a manner that does not discriminate
then, in a market with many sellers none who have a large market share,
each seller approximately attains his desired sales at the market clear-
ing price. As the approximation gets be-tter, the range of prices at
which the rationed sellers are willing to sell gets smaller. The limit-
ing, ncnatomic case yields the perfectly elastic supply curve.
It is for reasons mentioned above that many economists feel the
model of perfect competition is most suitable in the nonatomic case.
However, there are several reasons why one should be dissatisfied with
the nonatomic case as the "natural" setting for the model of perfect
competition. First, the above argument treats the buyer as an active
player while all other agents are treated as passive players. Sellers
may hold back en their supply just as the buyer held back on his demand,
The buyer may net lower price for fear that he will be rationed at the
market clearing price and perhaps forced to buy at above the market
clearing price. An argument which treats all agents symmetrically with
regard to price setting is needed. Second, the price undercutting of
the Bertrand-Edgeworth model suggests highly competitive behavior when
there is a small number of price setting agents. Third, and most dis-
turbing, is the following realization. If the nonatomic case is the ap-
propriate setting for the model of perfect competition, then we have no
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Cheory of the operation cf markets with a finite number of buyers and
sellers. Fortunately, this is not the case.
It must be admitted that in finite economies where all other agents
act passively, when a buyer holds up on his demand at the market clear-
ing price he faces an imperfectly elastic supply curve. The story does
not end here, however. This buyer may find that, even with his pur-
chases at below the market clearing price, he wishes to buy additional
amounts at the market clearing price. Buying these additional amounts
reduces the excess supply at the market clearing price and consequently
reduces the amount rationed sellers are willing to sell at the buyer's
price. As long as the buyer's demand at the market clearing price is
greater than the amount he actually buys at the market clearing price
he will want to buy still additional amounts, further reducing the sup-
ply at the price he has set. It is possible that this continues until
nothing is traded at other than the market clearing price. In Arvan
[ ] , it is shown when this occurs.
Now we return to the discussion of Clower-type constraints on sig-
naled trades. In order for the competitive equilibrium to survive these
strategic considerations, the buyer must be able to signal his demand
at the market clearing price regardless of any commitment to trade at
the lower price. Further, there must be offers to sell at the market
clearing price so that the buyer can express his unsatisfied demand.
If the Clower-type constraints are in force, the buyer can commit all
his cash to buy at the price he has set. Then, he has no way to express
his unsatisfied demand at the market clearing price, even if he is not
using this cash to make purchases. The difficulty is that, at the time
-o-
when Che buyer commits himself to purchase at the price he has set, he
can't know how much supply will be forthcoming at that price. If that
supply is large enough, the buyer may be forced to spend all the cash
he has committed. In order to give the buyer the freedom to express his
unsatisfied demand we must find a method of restoring feasibility when
the buyer has over-committed himself.
The organization of the remainder of the paper is as follows. In
section II, the formal model is presented under the assumption that sig-
naled trades are restricted by a Clower-type constraint. Sufficient
conditions are given for the existence of "rational expectations" equi-
libria under this assumption. The relationship between initial and
equilibrium allocations that is required to satisfy these conditions
demonstrates the rigidity of Clower-type constraints. In section III,
it is shown that if there is to be an institutional rule to restore in-
dividual feasibility so that an agent has greater freedom to signal
trades, then there is no way to rule out no trade equilibria, even under
rational expectations. In section IV, the model is slightly restruc-
tured and an institutional rule is provided under which individual fea-
sibility ceases to be a problem. Section V is a summary and conclusion.
II. The Formal Model
Consider an economy with K nonmonetary goods indexed by k. A
bundle of goods is represented by x. There are N agents indexed by
n. Each agent has utility u (x,m), u : R +
x
-* R, where m is an
amount of the monetary commodity. Assume u** is strictly quasiccncave
and increasing for each n. Each n has an endowment of goods,
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w ' = (w, w ), and an endowment of money, m • Assume w - |R , and
m 6 R . Trade is not necessary for survival. Call all such economies
classical exchange economies.
Now consider the following price game. There are two stages in
this game. Stages are indexed with either a one or two. The idea is
that stage two is "later" than stage one. During stage one, agents set
prices for the nonmonetary goods in terms of the money commodity. Agent
i -j- - n / nn\i n- _K , n r- _,K
n s action during stage one is a = (p ,s J where p - R, , and s EE ,
These symbols have the following interpretation. p is the price n sets
k
for good k. If s > then n is setting a buy signal and he will buy
K
at p up to s units of good k. If s, < 0, then n is setting a sell
n n n
signal and he will sell at p,_ up to -s, units of good k. Let a = X a .
n
In stage two, a is public knowledge.
In stage two agent n sends the price taking signal 6 = (t, , , .
.
,t„)
,
i N
t*. - !R for each i and t = 0. t, is the quantity signal n sends to
i n i "
agent i. t . > only if s, < 0. C. , < only if s, > 0. In words,
n signals to buy from i units of k (t , > 0) only if i signals to sell
units of k (s, < 0), and vice versa. Let 3= XS , t = Et., t = Xt
.
,
n n i
t in = t.-t. and t/n = X(t./n).ll .1
i
The next step is to describe transactions. Let y be the actual
transaction made by agent n as a price seller for good k. The rules
ngoverning y are:
k
y, = mm (s, , - t
,
) if S, > 0.k k nk k
= max (s,
,
- t
,
) if s, < 0.
k nx ic
=0 if s" = 0.
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This is the cost obvious rationing rule. Each price setter is a monop-
olist for the good that he has set the price. As such, the magnitude
of his trade is the minimum of supply and demand.
For price takers, the actual transaction agent n makes with price
n n
setter i is z.. The rules governing z are a little harder to formulate,
because the trades must be split among all price takers who signalled to
i. A rationing rule is needed for price takers. Consider the class, T,
of rationing rules specified by the following properties. I £T and
write 2n
,
= T(s?\ t.,/n, t n
,
) . Then:lk k ik lk
(3) When t .. > 0, i) T is nondecreasing in t and ii) T is
decreasing in s, , t.,/n.
(4) When t., > 0, i) T is concave in c, , and ii) T is
i*c ik
convex in t
.,
/n.lk
(5) T doesn't favor buyers or sellers, i.e.,
K.£. t ik /n, CJk) = -T(-s*. -t ik /n, -t^)
(6) T is continuous
(7) Price taking transactions are "consistent" with price
i
-
n t isetting transactions, i.e., y, = Ez.. . In particular
n
n n . .
i
i
i |
i
i
2 ik
= c ik
lf
! ^ SJ-
n ^
(6) T is nondiscriminatory. If t,,/n = t.,/j and t = t., ,
n 1 lk ik lk ik
then 2 ik
= 2 ik'
The resulting commodity bundle for agent n after periods 1 and 2 is:
(wr" + y
n
+ EzJ, m
n
- p
n
y
n
- Ep
i
zJ) . Note chat zJJ E 0.
Assumption 1 : Strategy spaces are defined by the Clower-Keynes con-
straint. Buy signals must be backed by cash while sell signals must be
backed by goods. Formally, at stage one p 6 K , p • aax(o,s ) < m
,
n n
and -s ' w Vn. At stage tv;o, a is known. The constraints at stage two
„ i ,, n. n n ,„ n. . , „ . ,„ n, n
are: E p • max(0,t.) <_ m -p • max(0,s ), and (- Z min (0,t.; < w +
Notaticnal "ote: max(0,sn ) = (max(0,s^) , . .
.
,max(0,s„) ) . Under assump-
i ts.
his coney holdings must be in R
tion 1, for every 1 6 T, n's final commodity bundle must be in (R and
The next step is to analyse the stage two subgarae given the stage
one signals. Consider the individual decision problem. In order to
choose the optimal price taking signals in stage two, n must guess
(know) the vector t/n. Given a and t/n,n can compute his final commod-
ity bundle as a function of his own stage two actions. It is assumed
that the particular T £ T is known to each agent. At this juncture as-
sume either that n knows t/n or that n has expectation of observing t/n
with probability 1. n's problem given a and t/n is:
n, h . n , _ n n n n „ i n Nmax u (w + y + I z,, m - p • y - E p • z . ) , suoject to:
- n . .• i . , l
x. ifn ifti
(1) t r: = (2) t n , sj ^ and t* = if s} = Vi,k
,
_. „ i ,- n s n n ,, n,(j; u p • maj:(0,t.J <_ m - p • max(0,s )
ifn
(4) - Z min(0,tn
v
) <_ w£ + min(G,s£) Vk.
iFn
To get an idea of what the optimal signal is like, assume for the
moment that u , T are continuously dif ferentiable. Then form the
Lagrangian L:
9-
L = u ( ) + X(m - p • max(,0,s ) - I p max(0,t.))
i^n X
+ I 6. (wn + minCO.sf1 ) + Z min(Q,tn , )).
k ifn
The first order conditions are:
gL
_
n n i „ , i , ik .
—-
~
U
k
T
3
" Um P k
A
3
" Ap
k
max( °»
~T-)
0t
ik i^n ' C iki
n
C
ik
+ 6, min(G, —) = 0.
n rRotational Note : u is the partial derivative or u " with respect to
th n n
the k good. u is the partial derivative of u with respect to the
m
money good. T is the partial derivative of the transaction function
with respect to n's signal.
When n is sending a buy signal for good k to two different sellers,
(6 = 0) , the first order conditions require:
tc
n_,i..n* ni, . i
"k
T
3
(s
k>
t
ik
/n
'
t
ik ) ~ VkT 3 ( )
m
\
, f ., > Q
\ T 3 ^• tJk/n ' tJ
n
k> - viT 3 ( } "pi
1
*
When a = 0, it must be that n buys only from the lowest price, price
setters. The first order conditions are expressed in terms of the
value of an additional unit signalled, not in terms of an additional
unit consumed, n buys from the different price setting sellers at a
rate where the marginal values of signals at different prices are
proportional to these prices. When n feels constrained in buying from
lower priced sellers, he oversignals his demand to make the constraint
more favorable (property 3 for T) . Since his capacity to oversignal
is limited by assumption 1, he may find it optimal to accept worse
terms of trade which guarantee a better volume of trade.
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Lemma 1 : If a is consistent with assumption 1 for all n and t/n
satisfies the sign constraints so that t/n is compatible with a,
n* n* n*
,
3 a vector S 3 3 solves n s stage two problem. Let B (a, t/n) be
n* n*
the set of all 8 . 3 ( ) is upper semicontinucus , u.s.c, in
(a, t/n). Further, there is a unique allocation for n associated with
n*
E (a, t/n).
Proof : As long as stage one price setters cannot sell at price equal
to zero, the stage two budget set of assumption 1, B (a), is compact
and E" ( ) is continuous in a. B (a) is independent of t/n.
Transactions are continuous in (a, t/n, 3 ) by assumption. The utility
function is continuous in allocations by assumption. Let
n, , ^n. n. n . n, n . . _ n, , n, n n n _ :
v (a, t/n, 6 ) = u (\i + y (a , t/n) + E z. (a, t/n, 8 ), m - p • y - I p
i^n i^n
The above implies v is continuous in (a, t/n, 6 )• The first two parts
of the lemma follow from the Berge maximum principle. Uniqueness of the
allocation follows from the strict quasiconcavity of the utility func-
tion and the curvature property, 4, of the transaction rule which guar-
antees convexity of the set of potential trades.
Let t/n(2) be the aggregate price taking signal excluding agent
n, when the joint price taking signal is £.
Definition 1 : For fixed a, S* is a Price Taking Mash Equilibrium,
P.T.N.E., if £
n '' :
€ B
n
*(a,t/n(6*)) Vn.
Let B*(a) be the set of all P.T.M.E. given the period 1 signal a.
Theorem 1 : Va consistent with assumption 1, B*(ct) f <£
Proof : Let 3(a) = XBn (ct) . B(a) is compact by Tychonoff's theorem. It is
convex since it is the product of convex sets. At this point c.ne would
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n*like to apply the correspondence XB (a,t/n( )) to B(a) and then argue
n
by Kakutani's theorem that such a correspondence has a fixed point. A
fixed point of this map is a P.T.N.E. Kakutani's theorem cannot be ap-
n*
plied directly since 8 (a, t/n) need not be convex. The following
lemma solves the problem.
Lemma 2 : va consistent with assumption 1, 3B (a,t/n) C B n (a,t/n)
~n
.
,9b li. nonempty, convex, and u.s.c. in t/n.
Proof: Set B°. ={3n =Bn *: E E
I
t
n
,
I
= min E E|t"*l}. Bn
min
._
' ik 1
.,
,
ik 1 '
lrti k ,n- _ m A i?n k mm
,n
is nonempty since B (a, t/n) is compact and E Ej is continuous.
ifn k
B is convex since |z . ! is concave in It.kl. B . is the subset ofmm ' ik 1 ' i ' mm
optimal signals in which signals are used most efficiently. Let
~n
r
n
_
_n*
-, Tn _ _n i n i i —n i „. , , In . , n
B = {6 e B : 3p cB
. , t., > t.,| Vi,k}. B includes B as
nun ik — ' ik mm
well as all optimal signals where there are zero marginal increments in
trade from signaling. The proof of the lemma completes the proof of
the theorem.
Lemma 3 : The correspondence B*( ) is u.s.c. in a, V a consistent with
assumption 1.
Proof: Let (a.) converge to a and £. £ B* (a
.
) such that <S.) converses
J 3 J J
n
to p*. The budget correspondence B ( ) is continuous at a since a has
, - . _n* _ T,n/ N ,n* ^ m,- . „
no zero prices. Since (3 . S B (a.) £ SB (a) vn.
If p
n
*'2 B
n
*(a,t/n(3*)) H n £ Bn (a) 3 vn (a , t/n (S*) ,
S
R
) > v
n
(a , t/n(3*)
,
i**
)
The continuity of v and B imply V; > 0, 3 an integer J and A € K^
1
,
II A il < t, A., < 0, only if 3., < 0, and A., > only if 2
n
,
> 0,ik ik ' ik ik
3bn
,
- Ae E
n (u.)Vi > J and vn (ct.,t/n(S*), Sn-A) > v
n
(a
. ,
t/n(3*) , S
n
*)
.
This is a contradiction.
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The next step is to proceed to solutions of the overall game. A
n
strategy in the overall game tor agent n is a stage one signal, a
,
satisfying assumption 1 and a function, 3 ( ), which chooses a stage
two signal given the joint stage two signal such that 3 (a) € B (a)
for all possible a.
Definition 2 : A Nash equilibrium of the overall game, N.E., is a vector
a*, and a vector of price taking functions,
B*( ), 3 Vn, v
n (a*,t/n(2*(a*)),Sn*) =
sup v
n ((a*/n,an ), t/n(2*(a*/n,an ) ) , 3 r'( 3*/n,an ) )
.
a ,0 ( )
Note : At a N.E, 3° (a*) € 3n (a*, t/n(3*(a*) ) . In other words, at a
Nash equilibrium of the overall game, the price taking functions applied
to the stage one signals give rise to a P.T.N.E.
The class of Nash equilibria is very large. To see this consider
the following. Suppose a* is consistent with assumption 1 and B*(a*)
contains a P.T.N.E. where each agent strictly improves himself over his
initial allocation. Let S*(ce*) be such a P.T.N.E. When a ? a let
e*/n solve:
minimize
I
max v ((a*/n, a ), t/n(6/n,3 ),2 )
3/n L £ n
for each n. This second stage function punishes agent n for deviating
from his stage one signal. Under this type of stage two reaction func-
n n*
tion n will find it optimal to set a = a
An argument can be made that equilibria with quantity constraints
are sustained when price setting agents have expectations akin to the
reaction functions of the above paragraph. An opposing argument can be
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ir.ade that agents will never hold such expectations. Since the model
has price signaling only once, there is no strategic value in punishing
an agent for deviating from his signaled price. Under more reasonable
expectations , agents would behave as maximizers in stage two, regardless
of the stage one signal. As long as the game is played under complete
information, agents should hold "rational" expectations about the conse-
quences of altering price signals. In this model, requiring agents to
hold rational expectations Is equivalent to requiring the N.E. to be
subgame perfect. Subgame perfection means the N.E. price taking func-
tion, 3* , satisfies: f3*(a) 6 B*(ct), for all a. Theorems 2 and 3 demon-
strate the nature and existence of subgame perfect N.E. under assumption
1.
Theorem 2 : If there exists a monopolistically competitive equilibrium,
M.C.E., where: i) for all k there exists a unique n such that w, > C,
ii) the single seller of good k sets the price of good k taking all
prices set by other sellers and the demand curve fcr k as given,
iii) for each n, the value of n's net demand at the M.C.E. price system,
pmax(0,x* (p)) , is less than n's available cash holdings, m , then under
assumption 1 there exists a subgame perfect N.E, which implements this
M.C.E.
Proof : The subgame perfect N.E. is constructed as follows. If agent v.
, . ii. n — i n n _ , , ,is the monopolist for good k then p. = p, and s, = -w. . Jror all gcccs,k k k k
n n
h, which n does not supplv, n sets p, > G and s, = 0. It is easy to
see that for these stage one signals there is a P.T.N.E. which yields
the M.C.E. allocations. From the definition of a M.C.E., the monopolist
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gains no advantage from altering his price signal. Buyer n gains no ad-
vantage from altering his stage one signal, i.e. by setting s,n > 0,
since the seller of h has already committed his entire endowment as a
price setter.
If any buyer did signal a positive buy quantity at a price close
to but below the M.C.E. price in stage one, then this equilibrium does
not survive. The monopolist feels quantity constrained at the price he
sets, in the sense that at the M.C.E. the monopolist's marginal rate of
substitution of his good for money, dees not equal the price which he
sets. The monopolist would be willing to sell a little more of his good
at a slightly lower price. The solution concept employed, subgame per-
fectness, requires the monopolist to do just that. Thus, if buyers do
signal positive buy quantities at prices near the M.C.E., it is no
longer optimal for the monopolist to oversignal in period 1. Oversignal
in this sense means there is a residual between endowment and actual
trades which are signaled in stage one so that the monopolist is not
obliged to trade at prices less advantageous to himself in stage two.
To complete this argument note that when the monopolist sells at the
buyer's price, his demand curve is altered. If the demand side of the
market is "thick," there is no optimal price configuration for buyers.
If the narket is actually a bilateral monopoly where any candidate for
equilibrium has trading at distinct buy and sell prices, then at least
one agent can dc better by altering his price.
If a subgame perfect N.E. exists in the model when there are two
or more agents on each side in every market, then it ruust correspond to
the competitive equilibrium, C.E. For example, there can't be a subgame
perfect N.E. in which trading occurs at two distinct sell prices. In
this case the lower price sellers will find it advantageous to raise
price. Likewise, if all sellers set the same price, which happens to
be above the market clearing price, then rationed sellers will find it
advantageous to undercut the market. However, subgame perfect N.E. may
not exist in this case. Nonexistence is a consequence of the perception
of monopoly power from oversignaling in stage one. Subgame perfect
equilibrium only exists if no agent finds it advantageous to oversignal.
This will occur if, when a seller tries to create a shortage at the
market clearing price by oversignaling his supply in stage one, buyers
can still fulfill their demands at the market clearing price because
other sellers fill the gap. These other sellers must oversignal their
supplies at the market clearing price to absorb the excess demand that
is created when the original seller oversignals his supply at above
the market clearing price.
Since agents on both sides in any market can oversignal, sellers
who oversignal at the market clearing price to deter strategic play by
other sellers must have enough residual supply to signal their desired
sales at the market clearing price in stage two. Likewise, buyers who
oversignal in stage one must have enough residual cash to signal desired
demand in stage two. When this occurs, there is a subgame perfect N.E.
which supports the C.E. Of course, when there is oversignaling at the
market clearing price, it is possible that there are P.T.N.E. in w-hich
some agents end up trading too much. However, there will always be a
P.T.N.E. where the C.E. allocation is attained. This is summarized in
the following theorem.
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Theorem 3 : Suppose p* is a C.E. price vector. Suppose for all n and k:
I w^ > -2 I min(0,x£(p*)) - min(0,x£(p*)
)
i^n i^n
and
Z m
1
>_ 2 I p*max(0,x (p*)) + p*niax(0,x
n
(p*) )
.
i^n i^n
Then there exists a subgame perfect N.E. which supports the C.E. at p*.
The amount of buffering required to sustain a theorem 3 type equi-
librium indicates the limitations of assumption 1. The difficulty with
assumption 1 is that stage two signals are not independent of stage one
signals. In the next section we introduce an assumption which allows
for this independence. Once this is done, the game as specified may
yield infeasible allocations. We examine existence of P.T.N.E. when
there is an institutional rule which reestablishes feasibility.
III. Institutional Rules which Restore Feasibility and Nonexistence of
P.T.N.E.
In this section we examine the decision problem of an agent in
stage two when there is an institutional rule which alters trades, when
necessary, so that final allocations are always individually feasible.
Any rule which restores feasibility must affect the trades of both an
agent who would otherwise end up outside his consumption set and the
trading partners of that agent. If individual endowments are public in-
formation, In stage two agent n will know the effect his signaling has
on the feasibility of others, given t/n. In general, the trades n par-
takes in as a price setter, y , are functions of not only n's price set-
ting signals and the price taking signals sent to n, but also all ether
-17-
signals
,
via this institutional rule. Even when t/n is given in stage
two, n can't regard y as fixed, but rather as a function of his own
stage two signal.
The indirect effect that n's stage two signal has on his trades as
a price setter leads to a technical problem. There is no way to guaran-
tee that the set of trades available to n is convex. When this set is
n*
not convex, the optimum correspondence, B , may be disconnected and
P.T.N.E. may not exist. An example is presented which illustrates why
the optimum correspondence may be disconnected. Another example is pre-
sented which shows why the set of trades may not be convex and why no
institutional rule can surmount this.
Since stage two signals are no longer constrained by prior stage
cne commitments and since there is a rule which reestablishes individual
feasibility, there is no longer any reason to constrain expressed de-
mands by cash on hand. However, as long as the rationing rule, T, al-
lows for positive increments in trade from signaling, it is necessary
to bound quantity signals. The bounds do not have the same interpreta-
tion as income limitations in a Walrasian budget constraint. They are
best interpreted as proxies for constraints on resources that are spent
in the rationing process. The allowed stage cne and stage two signals
are specified in the assumption below.
n_,J-.n .„ n> _n . n r
Assumption 2: At stage one p £ K
, ,
p • max(U,s ) < C , and -s < w
-t—
r
S
At stage two, a is known. The constraints at stage two are:
L p
1
• max(0,t") <.C^(a), and - I min(0,t") <_ wn .
ifn i^n
Under assumption 2 the set of possible stage two signals for n,
B
n (a) , is independent of n's stage one signal, a'. The numbers C and
-IS-
C' (a) are assumed to be large enough so chat n can signal Walrasian de-
mands
.
It is possible under assumption 2 that signaled trades yield indi-
vidually infeasible allocations. The institutional rule which restores
individual feasibility can be thought of as a mapping from signaled
trades into actual trades such that the mapping is continuous and does
not alter signaled trades when individually feasible allocations would
result.
Example 1 : There are five agents n=l,...,5 and three nonmonetary goods
k=i,2,3. Agents 3, 4, and 5 enter only as price setters. Agent 3 is a
3 - 4
buyer of good 1; s > 0. Agents 4 and 5 are sellers or good 2; -s > 0,
5 1
-s > 0. Agent 1 is a price setting seller ot good 3; -s_ > 0. Agent
1 is a price taker in the other markets; -t,. > and t , t > C. Agent31 42 52
2 2 2 2
2 is a price taker in all markets; -t > and t , t ,, , t > 0,
2 112 3
Assume the rollcving inequalities hola: t < ~ s -?> _C 3i * C 3i
> s t>12 4 12 5
t, „ + t.„ > -s„, and t cn + t.„ < -s„. These assumptions are summarized42 ^2 I oz. ji. i
in the following table.
Price Setter Price Takers Sell Market Price Takers
is are for price setters are constrained
1 3 1,2 no yes
2 4 1,2 yes yes
2 5 1,2 yes no
3 1 2 yes no
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Ic is conceivable chat at these signals agent 2 can just finance his
transactions. Suppose agent 1 desires to economize on his demand signal
for good 2. Since 1 is constrained in buying from agent 4 but not in
buying from agent 5, 1 can decrease t and increase t by a smaller
amount and maintain the same level of transactions. However, such a
change in l's signal has a nonneutral effect on agent 2. When C,„ is
decreased, 2's trade with agent 4 increases, since the rationing rule
requires that price setters not be rationed when price takers are con-
strained. 2's trades with agent 5 do not change when t_« is increased
by a small amount because the price takers are not rationed in that mar-
ket. Thus, as a consequence of l's economizing on his demand signal,
the value of 2's actual purchases increases. Since 2 could just finance
his purchases before, he must have negative balances after 1 alters his
signal. If the new rule is to continuously restore 2 to solvency then
as 1 economizes on his demand signal in market 2, 2's purchases must de-
crease or his supplies must increase. If the new rule is to preserve
voluntary exchange and the nondiscriminatory property, then when 2's
purchases are reduced, the amount that 1 supplies of good 3 is reduced,
and when 2's supplies are increased Che amount that 1 supplies of good
1 is reduced.
2 2 4 5
Now suppose in addition to the above that t,„ = t^, s„ = s„,
4 5
and p = p . Then, if agent 1 altered his signals for good 2 so that
t,„ = t_„ and c.„ = t,„, the situation is the same as before except
42 52 o2 42
that price takers 1 and 2 are constrained trading with agent 5 rather
than with agent 4. If these signals are optimal for agent 1, then his
optimum correspondence is not convex and, in fact, it is disconnected.
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The feasibility effect, the effect that agent n's price taking sig-
nals have on soce other agent's feasibility and consequently on the
trades n experiences from price setting, rules out the possibility of
extending the transaction rule in such a continuous way that outcomes
are always feasible and the set of trades available to any individual
is convex. One way to get around this problem is to ignore the old
transactions rule. Let
t-,/\ r «, i n I iii ni n ..,, v i n,n n,n ..F(a) = {z: l |z J 1 s , - z s > Vik, E p z + p • y (s ,t (z)
n/x i/n
and - I z - y (s ,t (z)) <_ w Vn}. F(a) is the set of all possible
.
_/ l ni?n
stage two trades that give feasible allocations when the price setting
signal is a. Recall that B(a) is the joint stage two budget set. If the
principle of voluntary exchange is adhered to for price setters, then
any transactions rule can be thought cf as a mapping from B(a) into F(a).
Note that both B(a) and F(a) are compact, convex sets since they are de-
fined by linear constraints, resources are scarce, and prices are
strictly positive.
One would like the transactions rule on B(a) n F(a) to be the
identity. When price takers are not rationed and the resulting trades
are individually feasible the transactions rule should generate these
trades. Cf course continuity of the rule is indispensible for proving
existence of the individual's optimum. The class of such rules is
nonempty. However there is still the problem arising from the fact
that for any "reasonable" rule in this class the set of trades avail-
able to agent n given a. and 2/n need not be convex. In this context
"reasonable" means dimension preserving.
-21-
Definition 3 : Let X C E. , Y C R , and p : x -<- Y a continuous map.
— Y
; is dimension preserving if for any X C X homeomorphic to B , the
unit ball in (R
,
o(X) does not contain a subset honeomorphic to B
for 1 <_ K
_^
L.
Consider F(a) as a subset of Euclidean space whose dimension is given
by fHi.k:
|
s | > 0} x (N-l) . Assume F° (a) + 0. This will be the
case if each agent's endowment of goods and money lie in the strictly
positive orthant.
Lemma 4 : If B(a) "» (B(a) n F(a) is nonempty, then there may not
exist a continuous dimension preserving mapping from B^:x) into F(c;)
which is the identity on B(a) n F(a) such that for all S/n G B(a)/n
the trades available to n form a convex set.
Example 2 : Consider an economy with two agents and 1 nonmonetary good.
Each agent has 1 unit of the good and 1 unit of money. The stage one sig-
1 2
nals are: a = (1,1), a = (2,-1). Agent 1 signals to buy up to 1 unit
of the good at price 1. Agent 2 signals to sell up to 1 unit of the
1 1 1good at price 1. B (a) = {t„: <_ 2t n <_ 1}. (Because there is only one
nonmonetary good it is acceptable tc take C
-
= m =1.)2,22-, 1 2
B~(a) = it : <_ ~t
1 ^_
1;. Both B (a) and B (a) are one dimentional.
—1 , —2 ,Suppose 1 chooses t = 1/3 and 2 chooses t, = -3/4. The resulting alic-
cations without concern for feasibility are: (2 — , - —) for agent 115 11
and (- —» 2 yr ) ior agent 2. If agent 1 were to signal z~ <_ — then
the resulting allocation would be individually feasible. Since we want
our feasibility rule to be dimension preserving and the set of trades
-22-
for agent 1, given t^", to be convex, it must be that as agent 1 in-2,1 i
creases t~ beyond — the trades at p =1 decrease in volume. Likewise
1 o
2 1if agent 2 were to signal -t <_ — then the resulting allocation would
be individually feasible. As agent 2 signals sales at p beyond ==-, the
trades at p * 2 must decrease if the mapping is to be dimension pre-
serving and the set of trades for agent 2 to be convex. Since t < —
2 8
—
2 2
and -t >
—
s the feasibility rule is not dimension preserving or the
set of trades for an agent is not convex or signaled trades are altered
even when they yield feasible allocations.
IV. A Reformulation of the Model and Existence of P.T.N.E.
The model is reformulated because of the difficulties described in
the previous section. The signal s in the new formulation is sent at
stage two rather than at stage one. This allows n to have some control of
his price setting trades. The dimensionality problem disappears. Nev-
ertheless it is still difficult to guarantee that the set of trades
available to agent n is convex. In the formal presentation this problem
does not disappear. For a joint stage two signal that is not a P.T.N.E.
the set of trades available to agent n may not be convex. The following
procedure is adcpted. Agents act as if the convex hull of available
trades can be obtained. They choose the best trades within this convex
hull and signal accordingly. Through efficient use of signals, the
optimal signal correspondence is convex and u.s.c. in everyone else's
joint signal. This yields a convex u.s.c. correspondence from the joint
set of possible signals to itself. A fixed point of correspondence is
a jointly feasible trade vector such that each individual's trades
-23-
maximize utility on the convex hull of the available trades to that in-
dividual. Hence by Kakutani's theorem a P.T.N.E. always exists.
The signalling constraints are given in the next assumption.
Assumption 3 : At stage one p 6 R . q 6 {-1,1} . If q" = 1, n is
setting a buy price for good k. If q, = -1 n is setting a sell price
for good k, a = (p ,q ). At stage two a is known. Let s
n
and t
n
be as
before. The stage two constraints are:
(1) -sf < w? Vkk — k
(2) ipl max(0,s
n
) - C
n
(a)
,
k k. — s
k
(3) Z E - min(0,t n , ) < w" Vk
.
' i iK. K.l^n k
(4) Z Ip.
1
max(t" ,0) < C°(a)
i^n k k
lk " l
C5) si q* 1 Vk
(6) tjk q* 10 Vi^n ,k 2
n
= (s
n
,t
n
)
The set of all permissible stage 2 signals will be denoted as Bn (a).
It will be shown that P.T.N.E. always exist under assumption 3.
However, under this formulation a new problem crops up. A P.T.N.E. will
always exist where each agent signals zero trades in stage two. Since
agents don't signal quantities in stage one, the quantity signal of
agent n can't influence the quantity signals of other agents. When all
other agents signal zero trades in stage two, agent n can't effect a
trade, even If there are pareto improving gains to be made from trading
at n's prices. When there are gains from trade at the prices set in
•24-
stage one, Che no trade P.T.N.E. is a trivial P.T.N.E. No trading may
be optimal. In this case, there won't be other P.T.N.E. and the no
trade P.T.N.E. is nontrivial
.
The trade that n partakes in as a price taker with price setter
i for good k is z . If z , > then n has bought good k. If z., <IK IK. IK.
then n has sold good k. The trade that n partakes in as a price setter
j
for good k is Z z~, . The opposite sign convention holds here.
. / nK
irv.
Let T be the old transactions rule. Trades are determined by the
following problem:
. .
.. . n n . 2
maximize - E (z. -t )
n,i?=n,k
with respect to z : n=l,...,N; i=l, . .
.
,N, i^n; k=l,...,K
suoject to:
(1) z^
k
t?, >_ v n,i#n,k
(2) |z" | < |T(s£,t,./n,t* )| ^a.ifci.l
IK. — r. Irs. Xr*
(3) -min(q!\o) [max(sf,-t
,
) + E z", + w"] >0 V n ,k
K K nK . / IK Kifn
(4) m** - ( Z d •z.
1
-P*z)>0 -„-n.
. ,
l n — v
if n
The constraint set is nonempty if the original endowment is
feasible. For then, the zero trade vector satisfies all the constraints
The constraint set is closed and convex since all constraints are weak
linear constraints. The family of constraints denoted (2) guarantees
boundedness of the constraint set. The objective function is strictly
concave. Consequently, there is a unique maximum so the trade rule is
_?<:_
well specified. For cc fixed, the constraint set is continuous in p
since T is a continuous function and since each constraint is linear
in the vector z. Thus, trades are continuous in S by the Berge maximum
principle.
If the family of constraints denoted by (3) and (4), the "feasibil-
ity contraints," are satisfied by z .. = T(s, ,t.,/n,t., ) Vn i^n.kik k ik ik
then the trade rule coincides with the previous scheme.
Theorem 4 : For all p S RV7 3 a nontrivial P.T.N.E.
Pf: Let Z
n
(ct,~/n) = { ( 2
n
, Z z
1
) : 3 p" = B
n
(a) and
.
i^n
z
n
- z
n (a,(g/n,Bn)), . zl = l z* (a, (ji/n, £n ) ) } . Zn (a,S/n) may not
.
_/ n , / nifn xrn
be convex. The effect that n's price taking signal has en i's feasibility
may effect i's crades with n as price setter. This effect ray be non-
concave in i's price taking signal. In this case Z (a, g/n) is not
convex. Let Z (a,g/n) be the convex hull of Z (a,3/n). Let
(o,P/n) = {(zn , E z
1
) S Z
n (a,g/n):
i*i
n
a , n
,
, „ ni. n , _ i n n i . .u(w + ( Z z -z ) , Q - ( Z p • z . - p • z ) J
..in
.
, 1 n —
lfn ifn
n r ~~n "*~i. n i * *~n n—
i
- -
—
-ti —! — * n
u (w + ( l z. - z ), m - ( I p z. - ?"z ) "(z Z z ) - Z (a.p/n))
. , x n . ; 1 n l.,nifn xrn i^n
Since trades are continuous in signals and B (a) is compact,
Z (a,p/n) is compact. Hence Z (a,S/n) is compact. Since the trade
rule is continuous in the joint price taking signal the correspondence
n • n
Z (a, ) is continuous in B/n. Hence the correspondence Z (a, ) is
n*
also continuous in c/n. By the Berge maximum principle Z (a, ) is
n r*
u.s.c. in S/n. Since u is concave Z' (a,3/n) is convex. Let
-26-
B
n
*(a,g/n) = {(s n ,tn ) € Bn (a) : (z
n
,-s
Q
) € Z
n
*(a,6/n), where
z , = T(s, ,t
., /n, t ., ) } . B is the set of signals that would signallk k ik lk
optimal trades for n if feasibility constraints were not a concern.
Since the transaction rule is continuous and Zn (a,) is u.s.c. in
c/n, Bn (a, ) is also u.s.c. in S/n. Just as in lemma 2, 3 a correspondenci
B
n 3 Bn (a,B/n) C Bn (a,6/n), 3n (a,g/n) is nonempty, convex, and 6n (cc, ) is
u.s.c. in S/n. In constructing this correspondence, the signal (s ,t )
is chosen so that s has the largest norm among those signals which are
optimal. This rules out no trade P.T.M.E. when others exist. The joint
correspondence B is an u.s.c. convex correspondence from B(a) to B(a).
By Kakutani's theorem, this correspondence has a fixed point.
Let 3* be such a fixed point. For each n, fs SB (a,6*/n). Let
z
* = TCs,
1
*, t* /n,tn*) Vn.i^n.k. Since g
n *
€
B
n (a,3*/n) 3 U** , I I1 ) 6 Z
ik k ik ik .; nirn
n«
—
i
9 s = - Z z . By the constraints on transactions
. ,
n
1**1 - I^Bj.t^/l.t^)! 1 |4| V possible trades z^. Thus
Z z , < t , ! for all possible trades z , . Thus is, j = I z , < t «
.,' nk 1 — ' nk 1 nk* ' k ' ., ' nk — nkirn irn
If feasibility were not a problem, at the fixed point no price setter
is rationed. The trades (z , Z z i ) are feasible for each n. it is
j. nifn
evident that when 3* is signalled these trades obtain. Hence 8* is a
P.T.N.E.
V. Summary and- Conclusion
In this paper it was argued that to sustain competitive equilibrium
when disequilibrium trading is possible, a level of latent, unfulfilled
signals to trade is necessary. The "right" constraints on signaled
trades don't immediately pop up. Clower-type constraints Imposed on
-27-
signaled trades make the competitive model applicable only in a highly
restricted set of economic environments. It was shown that agents can
be given greater freedom to signal trades when feasibility is guaranteed
via an institutional rule with no adverse effect on existence.
The entire discussion in the paper is made under the premise that
agents know fully the consequences of their signaling on actual traces,
when this is not the case a seller may not be indifferent to a demand
signal expressed with cash versus a demand signal where the buyer must
be successful in completing other transactions to finance the demand.
If the seller is not required to accept the latter type of signal, then
the effectiveness of such a signal depends on the confidence the seller
has in the buyer's ability to complete these other transactions. In a
world of uncertainty about trading opportunities, a Clower-type con-
straint may reemerge.
-28-
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